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How Can Federal Actors Compete on
Noncompetes? Examining the Need for
and Possibility of Federal Action on
Noncompetition Agreements
Robert McAvoy*
ABSTRACT
Employees have been frustrated by the restrictiveness of
noncompete agreements and confused about their enforceability
for decades. The added complication of choice-of-law provisions
in employment contracts with noncompetes creates a sea of unpredictability for both employees and employers.
Each state applies its own policy to noncompete agreements.
While every state treats noncompetes differently than typical
contract provisions, a broad spectrum exists between the states
that are friendly and those that are hostile to the enforcement of
noncompetes. Employees and employers often fail to understand
whether their noncompete is enforceable under the jurisdiction
chosen by the contract, and courts override choice-of-law provisions in connection with noncompetes in an unpredictable
manner.
This lack of clarity has caused employers and employees to
disregard state law, with noncompete agreements occurring at a
steady amount in all states, regardless of a state’s relative stance
on them. A federal policy on noncompetes would alleviate this
uncertainty for both parties, protect employees from unfair or
unenforceable noncompetes, and maintain employers’ legitimate
business interests in a reasonable noncompete.
This Comment will examine the prospects of both federal
legislation and a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule. Federal
legislation is the most effective means to address the aforementioned issues and preempt state noncompete law. In the alternative, an FTC rule, although possible with a motivated FTC, faces
a number of challenges for both rulemaking and preemption of
state laws. Although the FTC likely has the authority to create a
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State University Dickinson Law, 2022.
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beneficial noncompete rule and preempt state law, Congress
should be the entity to regulate noncompetes because federal
legislation is more likely than an FTC rule to survive legal
challenges.
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INTRODUCTION

Christopher Ridgeway worked for Stryker, an international
medical technologies corporation incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Michigan.1 Ridgeway worked for the
company in Louisiana.2 Stryker terminated Ridgeway, then sought
to enforce a noncompete agreement he previously signed to prevent him from working for a competitor by suing him in the West1. Stone Surgical, LLC v. Stryker Corp., 858 F.3d 383, 386–91 (6th Cir. 2017).
2. Id.
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ern District of Michigan.3 The Western District of Michigan, and
later the Sixth Circuit, applied Michigan law because the parties
had selected Michigan as the forum and governing law for the employment contract.4 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Louisiana
law severely restricts noncompetes, but applied Michigan law instead because of the parties’ choice-of-law agreement.5 The court’s
decision resulted in the enforcement of Ridgeway’s noncompete
agreement and thereby restricted his freedom to work.6
Patrick Miles worked for Nuvasive, Incorporated (“Nuvasive”)
in California.7 He left to join a competitor, and Nuvasive responded
with a lawsuit in Delaware, where it was incorporated.8 The parties
had agreed their employment contract would be governed by Delaware law, which would enforce a noncompete provision preventing
Patrick from joining a competitor.9 Instead, the Delaware court
overrode the choice-of-law provision and applied California law, invalidating the noncompete agreement and allowing Miles to join
the competitor.10 California law significantly disfavors noncompetes, and the court found the fundamental public policy of California outweighed Delaware’s interest in freedom to contract.11
Shashi Batra lived and worked for Estee Lauder Companies in
California, but a choice-of-law clause in his employment contract
subjected the contract to the law of New York, the location of Estee
Lauder’s principal place of business.12 In Batra’s case, a New York
court applied New York law to enforce the noncompete clause in
Batra’s employment contract, barring Batra’s newfound employment with a competitor.13 The court acknowledged that the application of New York law and the resultant enforcement of the
noncompete agreement ran counter to a fundamental policy of California, but concluded that California’s interest in protecting work3. Id.
4. Id. The Court determined that “Louisiana’s interest in protecting its employee from unfair non-compete clauses is not materially greater than Michigan’s
interest in protecting its businesses from unfair competition . . . although Michigan
law favors non-competes and Louisiana law severely restricts them[.]” Id. at 391.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Nuvasive, Inc. v. Miles, No. 2017-0720-SG, 2019 WL 4010814, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 26, 2019).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 7.
11. CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE § 16600 (1941) (prohibiting most noncompetes);
Nuvasive, 2019 WL 4010814, at *1.
12. Estee Lauder Co. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
13. Id.
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ers was not materially greater than New York’s interest in
protecting companies.14
Noncompete agreements, nondisclosure agreements, and nonsolicitation agreements, which are known collectively as restrictive
covenants, are designed to protect the employer’s business interests
during and after employment, but noncompetes come at a cost for
the employee and business competitors.15 A noncompete typically
restricts an employee’s post-employment movement to the employer’s competitors within a specific geographic area and time
period.16
A choice-of-law provision in an employment contract is an
agreement between the employer and employee selecting which
state’s laws will govern enforcement of their contract.17 In many
cases, these provisions require the contract to be governed by the
law of a different state than the state where the employment takes
place.18 Employment contracts may also contain forum selection
clauses that require the contract to be litigated in a specific state.19
Noncompete agreements accompanied by choice-of-law provisions yield unpredictable results.20 Throughout the 50 states lies a
14. Id. at 173.
15. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete
Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 504–05 (2016) (listing the various types of
restrictive covenants and noting the negative impacts noncompetes have on employees and competitors); see also infra Section II.A (discussing how noncompetes
can be harmful to employees and business competitors).
16. See, e.g., Evan Starr, JJ Prescott, & Norman D. Bishara, Noncompete
Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force, J.L. & ECON. 1 (2021) [hereinafter Labor
Force] (explaining that noncompetes are typically limited by time and geography).
17. See, e.g., Martin v. Stassen Ins. Agency, Inc., 2008 WL 5220283, at *1 (Wis.
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2008) (“This Agreement shall be governed in all respects,
whether as to validity, construction, capacity, performance, or otherwise, by the
laws of the State of Illinois.”).
18. See, e.g., Stone Surgical, LLC v. Stryker Corp., 858 F.3d 383, 386–91 (6th
Cir. 2017) (applying Michigan law in a Michigan court because of choice-of-law
and forum selection clauses despite the employment occurring in Louisiana).
19. See, e.g., Martin, 2008 WL 5220283, at *1 (“Any suit or proceeding arising
out of or related to this Agreement shall be commenced only in a state court located in McHenry County, Illinois or a federal court located in Rockford Illinois,
and each party to this Agreement hereby consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of
such courts.”).
20. Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of
Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 376 (2003) (finding that nonenforcement of choice-oflaw provisions in employment contracts was most common in cases involving
noncompete agreements). An Ohio judge famously referred to noncompete jurisprudence as “a sea—vast and vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. One can
fish out of it any kind of strange support for anything, if he lives so long.” Arthur
Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio C.P.
Cuyahoga Cnty. 1952).
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wide spectrum of laws governing noncompetes.21 Employers, who
write the noncompete provisions and tend to control the terms, including choice-of-law provisions and forum selection, will often
choose a governing body of law that they expect will uphold the
noncompete.22 Sometimes, the employer’s attempt to select a
favorable law fails, and the forum court casts aside the choice-oflaw provision to invalidate the noncompete under the law of the
state where the employment took place.23 Alternatively, courts
often uphold the employment contract’s choice-of-law provision,
justifying the efforts of the employer, who generally controls the
state chosen in a choice-of-law provision, and confusing the employee, who may not have been aware of the provision.24 Employers take advantage of this lack of clarity by pressuring their
employees to sign noncompetes regardless of whether the agreement would be enforceable in either jurisdiction.25
21. See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee
Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 778–79 (2011) (detailing the spectrum of
approaches taken by states).
22. See e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 978 (2006) (noting that employers routinely provide
noncompetes after the employment has been accepted, creating the illusion for the
employee that the noncompete is simple routine paperwork); Ravetto v. Triton
Thalassic Tech., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 325 (Conn. 2008) (“[T]he employer usually
drafts the employment agreement.”); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdiction Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and
the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1422 (2008) (“Employers
typically are the first movers in [noncompete] litigation—they sue, alleging breach
of contract and related claims. Firms therefore have a much greater ability in this
context . . . to control the judicial forum[.]”); id. at 1389 (“[In] employment law . . .
management typically chooses the terms governing [the employment relationship.”); id. at 1399 (“Managers . . . have strong incentives to control legal risks
through the selection of favorable state law.”).
23. See, e.g., Nuvasive, Inc. v. Miles, No. 2017-0720-SG, 2019 WL 4010814
(Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2019) (overriding a Delaware choice-of-law provision because
the noncompete agreement was counter to California public policy).
24. See, e.g., Curtis 1000 v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994) (overturning
district judge’s finding that a Delaware-governed noncompete would be repugnant
to Illinois public policy and therefore enforcing the noncompete using the chosen
Delaware law); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects
of (Unenforceable) Contracts, J.L., ECON. & ORG. 633, 665–66 (2020) (hereinafter
Behavioral Effects) (finding that noncompetes often prevent employee movement
about the workforce regardless of whether the noncompete would be enforceable
in court); Rachel Arnow-Richman, The New Enforcement Regime: Revisiting the
Law of Employee Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles Sullivan)
with 2020 Vision, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1223, 1232, n.35 (2020) (noting that
many noncompetes would likely be unenforceable if taken to court); J.J. Prescott,
Norman D. Bishara, & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements:
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This Comment will address the uncertainty faced by both employees and employers in the existing noncompete-choice-of-law
framework and argue that the existing body of law creates an unnecessary level of unpredictability that can be costly for employers
and even more costly for employees.
A federal standard for noncompetes would provide clarity and
predictability to employees and employers. This federal standard
should generally prohibit noncompetes except in certain limited circumstances. Federal legislation would be effective at solving the existing problems with noncompetes and would preempt state laws,
while a rule issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would
face significantly more hurdles that could undermine its effectiveness.26 While an FTC rule would have the force of law and preempt
state noncompete laws, a variety of legal battles could sabotage the
FTC rule.27 Because of these risks, federal legislation is the best
means to reduce uncertainty and protect employees from exploitative noncompete policies without completely diminishing an employer’s legitimate business interests in noncompete clauses.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Noncompetes: A Controversial Employment Contract
Provision
Noncompetes harm employees by restricting their freedom to
move about the workforce.28 Without freedom of movement, emThe 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 460–62 (2016)
(finding that a state’s tendency to favor or disfavor noncompetes has no impact on
whether employers use noncompetes in their employment contracts).
26. See infra Section III (analyzing the potential effectiveness of federal legislation to provide uniformity and the potential hurdles FTC rulemaking may face).
27. See infra Section III.A.2 (analyzing the feasibility and potential effectiveness of an FTC rule).
28. See Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin, & Randall S. Thomas, An
Empirical Analysis of Noncompete Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment
Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51 (2015) (showing employers use noncompetes
and other restrictive covenants “to impede the postemployment mobility of key
employees”); Bishara & Starr, supra note 15, at 505 (“[Noncompetes restrict] an
individual worker’s otherwise free choice of leaving one employer to join another
competing employer.”); see also Hearings to Examine Noncompete Agreements and
American Workers, Including S.124 to Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 to Prevent Employers from Using Non-compete Agreements in Employment
Contracts for Certain Non-exempt Employees, and S.2614, to Prohibit Certain
Noncompete Agreements Before the S. Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship Comm.,
116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Keith A. Bollinger). Mr. Bollinger told the committee his story, in which he left a failing company that cut his pay twice to join a
competitor offering him his dream job as an operations manager. Id. His previous
employer used his noncompete to remove him from that position, and his career
suffered for years as a result. Id.
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ployees face limitations on their ability to pursue higher wages and
better opportunities in their occupations.29
Despite this restriction on employee mobility, there are specific instances in which noncompete agreements make sense for the
employment relationship.30 For example, noncompetes are often
used during the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership to
protect the goodwill and integrity of the sale.31 Further, proponents
of noncompetes note that employers are more willing to invest in
specialized training and divest valuable information to employees
without the threat of an employee moving to a competitor.32 Others
justify noncompetes as a means for employees to negotiate higher
salaries and benefits in exchange for agreeing to restrict future
movement.33 However, only 10 percent of employees with noncompetes report attempting to negotiate the terms of their noncompete,
and more than 30 percent learn about their noncompete only after
they have accepted the job.34
In the cases of high-level employees with access to valuable
trade secrets, noncompetes protect an employer’s legitimate business interests in their investment in the employee’s human capital,
and high-wage employees generally receive a negotiated compensation boost in exchange for such a restriction on their future movement.35 On the other end of the spectrum, noncompetes frequently
appear among low-wage employees who lack protectable information that would justify the noncompete, and these employees usu29. See, e.g., Bishara & Starr, supra note 15, at 505. The authors note:
[The advantage to the employer] comes at a cost for the individual employee and harms specific business competitors by denying them access to
valuable talent, ideas, and skills. There may also be costs for the economy
and harm to the creation of positive spillovers, like innovation and new
venture creation.
Id.
30. See id. at 505 (explaining arguments in favor of certain noncompetes).
31. Id. at 505. California, which generally prohibits noncompetes, allows them
in connection with a sale of a business. CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE § 16601 (1941); see
Alliant Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Gaddy, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 266–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(“The reason for this exception . . . is to prevent the seller from depriving the buyer
of the full value of its acquisition, including the sold company’s goodwill . . . The
sold business’s goodwill is the expectation of that patronage which has become an
asset of the business.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
32. See Labor Force, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining the arguments in favor of
noncompete agreements).
33. See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes, 87
U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 1036–37 (2020) (detailing how an employee may demand
compensation in exchange for the noncompete before or during the course of their
employment).
34. Labor Force, supra note 16, at 8.
35. Id. at 15.
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ally do not negotiate or receive anything of value in exchange for
their noncompete.36
Jimmy John’s sandwich chain made national news for subjecting its low-wage sandwich makers to noncompetes; after a string of
lawsuits resulting in settlements with state Attorneys General,
Jimmy John’s agreed to notify its employees that the noncompetes
were unenforceable, but low-wage workers still find themselves
subjected to noncompetes in many instances.37 Employers’ motivations for these noncompetes can be anticompetitive in nature, aiming to limit industry wage growth, depress the employment market
for competitors, and preempt potential competition from departing
employees.38
B. Inconsistent State Policies Cause Unpredictable Outcomes for
Employees and Employers
1. State Policies Vary Considerably, Both in Policy and
Enforcement
a. Variety in Policies
State courts and legislatures recognize the potential for certain
noncompetes to be contracts of adhesion that negatively impact individual workers and the greater labor market.39 Accordingly, each
36. Id.; see also Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop
Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2XMdNla [https://
perma.cc/2P67-FL5Y] (reporting on noncompetes for camp counselors, yoga instructors, event planners, and even college interns). Low-wage noncompetes are
prevalent and impactful enough that one study found Oregon’s 2008 ban on hourly
and low-wage noncompetes increased hourly wages for all hourly workers by “2.23.1 percent on average, with effects as great as 6 percent over a [7]-year period.”
Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of NonCompete Agreements, MGMT. SCI., Apr. 2021, at 4.
37. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York,
A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement With Jimmy John’s To Stop Including
Non-Compete Agreements In Hiring Packets (June 22, 2016) (on file with the New
York State Office of Attorney General); Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Attorney
General of Illinois, Madigan Announces Settlement with Jimmy John’s For Imposing Unlawful Noncompete Agreements (December 7, 2016) (on file with the Illinois Attorney General); Robert E. Entin, That Was Fast: Jimmy John’s Nixes NonCompetes, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://bit.ly/3CE5qYR.
38. See Labor Force, supra note 16, at 2; ALAN KRUEGER, ALAN & ERIC
POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 1 (2018), https://bit.ly/3Bqldcl [https://perma.cc/JGP9BTTY]; MATT MARX, REFORMING NON-COMPETES TO SUPPORT WORKERS 4
(2018), https://bit.ly/3GwnZ3s [https://perma.cc/LD3J-QMJ9].
39. See, e.g., Watson v. Waffle House, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985)
(“The rationale behind the distinction [between employment noncompetes and
noncompetes stemming from a sale of business] is that a contract of employment
inherently involves parties of unequal bargaining power to the extent that the re-
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state has a policy specific to noncompetes, but state noncompete
policies vary both in form and effect.40 Without a uniform model
law for noncompete agreements, each state has been left to create
its own policy, either through statutes, regulations, or common
law.41 The positions from which jurisdictions evaluate noncompete
law can be grouped into four categories:42 (1) At one extreme, California and North Dakota statutes ban traditional employment
noncompete agreements.43 (2) The next group, the largest of the
four and including Illinois, New York, and Virginia, is “affirmatively hostile” to noncompete agreements by judicially disfavoring
them in many instances.44 (3) A smaller group of states strives for a
neutral balance between the interests of employers and employees.45 (4) Lastly, some states treat noncompete agreements as
sult is often a contract of adhesion.”); CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE § 16600 (1941)
(“Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained
from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.”).
40. See Restrictive Covenants in Employment, HEINONLINE, https://bit.ly/
2YH8osQ [https://perma.cc/VNk8-DSEL] (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) (providing an
overview of each state’s noncompete policies as of 2019).
41. See id. (listing each state’s noncompete policy as of 2019).
42. Michael Selmi, Trending and the Restatement of Employment Law’s Provisions on Employee Mobility: Essay, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1369, 1379 (2015).
43. CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE § 16600 (1941); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 9-08-06.
44. Selmi, supra note 42, at 1379; see, e.g., Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 940 N.E.2d 153, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“One of the oldest and best
established of the policies developed by courts is that against restraint of trade.”)
(internal quotations omitted); BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223
(N.Y. 1999) (“In general, we have strictly applied the rule [of reasonableness] to
limit enforcement of broad restraints on competition.”); Motion Control Sys., Inc.
v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 425 (Va. 2001) (“Covenants not to compete are restraints
on trade and accordingly disfavored . . . . The Employer bears the burden to show
that the restraint is reasonable and no greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.”). Illinois passed a new, more restrictive
noncompete law that will become effective in 2022. Ill. Laws, Amendment 1 to SB
672 (2021). This Comment’s analysis of Illinois focuses on its noncompete law prior
to 2022.
45. Selmi, supra note 42, at 1379; see, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869
A.2d 884, 896–97 (N.J. 2005). The New Jersey court said:
[New Jersey’s test] requires us to determine whether (1) the restrictive
covenant was necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests in
enforcement, (2) whether it would cause undue hardship to the employee, and (3) whether it would be injurious to the public. Depending
upon the results of that analysis, the restrictive covenant may be disregarded or given complete or partial enforcement to the extent reasonable
under the circumstances.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also KidsKare, P.C. v. Mann, 350 P.3d 1228,
1231 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). The New Mexico court stated:
Covenants not to compete that restrict employment present competing
principles: the freedom to contract and the freedom to work . . . Covenants not to compete with reasonable restraints will be enforced when
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typical agreements between two consenting parties.46
Courts also take a variety of approaches to an overbroad
noncompete.47 In some states, courts “blue pencil,” or rewrite, illegal noncompetes to maintain them in conformance with the state’s
restrictions.48 In other states, courts only enforce the reasonable
parts of a noncompete if they are grammatically intact after removal of the invalid parts.49 Other states invalidate overbroad employment noncompetes outright due to the fact that the “blue
pencil doctrine” can encourage employers to write overly broad
noncompetes with the knowledge that a court would merely amend
them rather than striking them down.50
Regardless of how strongly states oppose noncompetes, most
jurisdictions employ some form of a “reasonableness” test to assess
noncompete agreements.51 However, states vary widely in which
they are not against public policy, and any detriment to the public interest
in the possible loss of the services of the convenator is more than offset
by the public benefit arising out of the preservation of the freedom of
contract.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 1378; see, e.g., Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768–69
(Tex. 2011) (analyzing noncompete agreements in Texas with the viewpoint that
they are simply another form of contract between two consenting parties); FLA.
STAT. §542.335 (b)–(c) (2016) (permitting noncompete agreements that serve a
legitimate business interest—including a long yet inexhaustive list of legitimate
business interests—and allowing courts to blue pencil, or amend, unreasonable
noncompetes into a permissible restrictive covenant). Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit has suggested that courts should treat noncompetes like any other contract.
Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 669–71 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
47. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 369 (6th ed. 2017).
48. See, e.g., Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 n.1
(Minn. 1980).
49. See, e.g., Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 277 A.2d 512, 514–15 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1971).
50. See, e.g., White v. Fletcher/Mayo/Assoc., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746, 748 n.2 (Ga.
1983) (“If severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts
of a particular case are not unreasonable. This smacks of having one’s employee’s
cake, and eating it too.”) (quoting Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682–83 (1960)). Wisconsin has statutorily rejected
the blue pencil doctrine. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2016) (“Any covenant, described in
this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and unenforceable
even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable
restraint.”).
51. See Thomas Reuters, Non-Compete Agreements, 50 State Statutory
Surveys: Employment: Private Employment, WESTLAW, 0060 Surveys 23 (Nov.
2020) (showing many states that require a reasonableness test); see also, e.g., Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 733 (Pa. 1995) (“In order for a
‘non-competition’ covenant to be enforceable, it must . . . be reasonably limited in
both time and territory.”) (internal citations omitted); Motion Control Sys., Inc. v.
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factors they consider and whether to start the analysis with a presumption in favor of or against the noncompete.52
b. Some States Show Unexpected Levels of Noncompete
Enforcement
Inconsistencies exist between the apparent strength of a state’s
noncompete policy based on its language and its actual strength as
enforced by courts. One might expect states with more restrictive
noncompete policies to enforce noncompete agreements less often
in court. This logic proves true for some states, such as California
and North Dakota; their statutes ban most noncompetes, and courts
accordingly almost never enforce noncompetes.53
Meanwhile, other states show unexpected patterns in noncompete enforcement.54 For example, Texas grades low in enforceability
of noncompetes, only surpassing ten other states, despite the fact
that its policy seems relatively accepting of noncompetes at face
value.55 On the other hand, the language of Colorado’s noncompete
law56 is stricter than that of most states, but Colorado grades in the
East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 425–26 (Va. 2001) (“The restraint . . . must be reasonable in
light of sound public policy.”).
52. Compare Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90 (2017)
(requiring a noncompete to overcome three hurdles to be considered reasonable),
and Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976) (“Generally[,] negative covenants restricting competition are enforceable only to the extent
that they satisfy the overriding requirement of reasonableness.”), with FLA. STAT.
§ 542.335 (b)–(c) (2016) (permitting noncompete agreements that serve a legitimate business interest, including a long yet inexhaustive list of legitimate business
interests). See also Bishara, supra note 21, at 773 (“What one set of state courts
deem a reasonable restriction on the employee’s activities may indeed vary significantly from a court’s application of the same standard in another jurisdiction.
States also vary in what they consider a protectable interest.”).
53. See Prescott, Bishara, & Starr, supra note 25, at 459 (reproducing Evan
Starr, Consider This: Firm-Sponsored Training and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete 16–17 (Nov. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (investigating the impact of noncompetes on firm investments in employee training and
showing the level of enforcement in all fifty states)).
54. See infra Section II.B.1.b (detailing inconsistencies between perceived
policy strength and actual enforcement by courts in various states).
55. See Prescott, Bishara, & Starr, supra note 25, at 459 (showing Texas’s enforceability index ranks 41st out of 51 states). Starr quantified enforcement intensity using confirmatory factor analysis. Id.; see also Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354
S.W.3d 764, 768–69 (Tex. 2011) (analyzing noncompete agreements with the viewpoint that they are simply another form of contract between two consenting
parties).
56. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2016). The statute states:
It shall be unlawful to use force, threats, or other means of intimidation
to prevent any person from engaging in any lawful occupation at any
place he sees fit. . . . Any covenant not to compete which restricts the
right of any person to receive compensation for performance of skilled or
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top half of states for actual enforcement.57 While Illinois’s policy is
perceived to be in the “hostile” group of states, Illinois’s enforcement level ranked within the top ten in 2009.58 Although there is
clear inconsistency between expected enforceability based on state
policy and actual enforceability, it is unclear what causes these
differences.59
Despite this great variation in both appearance of state law and
enforceability of noncompete agreements across states, the prevalence of noncompete agreements in employment contracts is remarkably consistent throughout the United States.60 While the
cause of this phenomenon cannot be definitively determined, it
could be a result of employees’ perceptions of enforceability having
little basis in reality.61 If employees and employers rarely understand when their noncompetes are unenforceable, the strength of a
unskilled labor for any employer shall be void [with four limited specific
exceptions].
Id.
57. See Prescott, Bishara, & Starr, supra note 25, at 459 (showing Colorado’s
enforceability index ranks 22nd out of 51 states).
58. See Selmi, supra note 42, at 1379 (grouping Illinois into a group of states
that are “affirmatively hostile” to noncompetes based on the wording of their policies). Illinois bans noncompete agreements for low-wage workers by statute and, at
common law, uses the Restatement standard for a noncompete to satisfy three
requirements to be found reasonable. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 90 (2017); Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393,
396 (Ill. 2011). The court stated:
A restrictive covenant, assuming it is ancillary to a valid employment relationship, is reasonable only if the covenant: (1) is no greater than is
required for the protection of a legitimate business interest of the employer-promisee; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employeepromisor, and (3) is not injurious to the public.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Prescott, Bishara, & Starr, supra note 25, at
459 (showing only seven states enforce noncompetes more than Illinois).
59. Phillip D. Thomas, Would California Survive the Move Act?: A Preemption Analysis of Employee Noncompetition Law, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 823, 831
(2017).
60. See Prescott, Bishara, & Starr, supra note 25, at 460–62 (finding that about
18% of workers are bound by noncompete agreements across all 5 state quintiles
of relative enforceability, and any variation that does exist is not statistically significant and trends in the unexpected direction).
61. See id. at 462–63 (noting that this phenomenon could be a result of employers misinforming employees by asking them to sign a noncompete agreement
regardless of its validity); see also Behavioral Effects, supra note 25, at 665–66.
Asserting:
[A] noncompete is associated with both a longer tenure and a reduced
propensity to leave for a competitor even when the noncompete in question is unenforceable under state law. . . . [I]n both enforcing and
nonenforcing states—approximately 40% of employees with noncompetes identify their noncompete as a factor in turning down job offers
from competitors.
Id.
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state’s noncompete law loses its influence over whether the parties
enter into an unenforceable noncompete.62
Ultimately, the face-value enforceability of a state’s policy on
noncompete agreements does not necessarily predict the state’s actual enforceability of noncompete clauses by courts, and neither
state policies nor their enforceability impact the prevalence of these
agreements in the labor market.63 Noncompetes appear at a steady
rate across jurisdictions, regardless of whether they would be
enforceable.64
2. Choice-of-Law Provisions Create Uncertainty
Choice-of-law provisions add further confusion to noncompete
enforcement.65 Employees in states that are hostile to noncompetes
may be surprised to find a choice-of-law provision subjecting them
to a stricter noncompete law restricting their mobility in the
workforce.66 Likewise, employers might rely on a choice-of-law
provision to restrict employees’ post-employment mobility only for
a court in their chosen state to strike down the noncompete after a
conflict of laws analysis.67
When a contract with a choice-of-law provision becomes the
subject of a lawsuit, the forum court uses its state’s choice-of-law
rules to determine whether to uphold the choice-of-law provision.68
Often, a court will only reach the choice-of-law issue if it finds that
there is a genuine conflict between the laws of the potentially applicable jurisdictions.69
State law governs how to determine which law to apply in a
contract dispute with a choice-of-law provision, creating even more
62. Id.
63. See id. at 668 (“Today, many employees may turn down a job offer they
would have otherwise taken simply because they incorrectly believe their noncompete is enforceable.”).
64. See Labor Force, supra note 16, at 7 (finding little differences in noncompete incidence between states that will or will not enforce them).
65. See supra Section II.B.2 (analyzing how choice-of-law provisions add unpredictability to noncompete enforcement).
66. See, e.g., Zimmer, Inc. v. Sharpe, 651 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846–50 (N.D. Ind.
2009) (enforcing a noncompete clause from Louisiana in an Indiana court differently than a Louisiana court would have interpreted the same noncompete clause).
67. See, e.g., Nuvasive, Inc. v. Miles, No. 2017-0720-SG, 2019 WL 4010814, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2019) (refusing to enforce a noncompete clause from California despite its enforceability in the jurisdiction of choice).
68. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding
that, in diversity cases, courts should apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum
state).
69. See, e.g., Allen v. Great American Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162
(Ind. 2002); see also Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 at 497.
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uncertainty for the parties.70 In deciding which law to apply in
noncompete cases with an agreed-upon choice-of-law provision,
many courts apply their state’s adoption of Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.71 Section 187 directs the
court to apply the law chosen by the contract unless, in relevant
part, application of that law would be “contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which
. . . would be the state of the applicable law in the absence [of a
choice-of-law clause].”72 Uncertainty also arises from employers
bringing action against another employer’s new hires in unexpected
forums.73
3. Employees and Employers Need Greater Predictability and
Clarity: A Federal Solution
Uncertainty permeates throughout the current noncompete
landscape.74 Presumably, many employees do not even consider the
fact that their agreement might not be enforceable. While some employers may take advantage of this knowledge gap and their power
over the terms of the contract by knowingly writing unenforceable
noncompetes, employers may also fail to anticipate the result of
70. See Anthony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV.
167, 192 (2000) (“[C]urrent law is characterized by a welter of different choice-oflaw approaches.”) (citing Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 n.2 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that ten different choice-of-law policies exist
throughout the states)).
71. See, e.g., Zimmer, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (“Indiana law on the public policy exception to choice of law provisions in contracts appears to be consistent with
the more detailed guidance available from Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law.”).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. L. INST.
1971); see, e.g., Zimmer, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (using Section 187 for a choice-oflaw analysis); Cardoni v. Prosperity Bank, 805 F.3d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying Texas’s adoption of Section 187(2) to uphold a choice-of-law provision with
respect to a nonsolicitation agreement but invalidate it with respect to a noncompete agreement).
73. See, e.g., Application Grp. v. Hunter Grp., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that California law rendered a noncompete clause unenforceable despite being a contract between a Maryland employee and Maryland employer with a Maryland choice-of-law provision because a California company
sought to hire the Maryland employee for remote consulting work).
74. Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to
Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 1006 (2012)
(“[N]oncompete litigation outcomes across jurisdictions and industry contexts are
largely unpredictable and appear to be guided by the court’s intuitive and subjective preferences . . . [giving] an overall impression of ad hoc decision making.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-2\DIK210.txt

unknown

2022] HOW CAN FEDERAL ACTORS COMPETE

Seq: 15

ON

9-FEB-22

NONCOMPETES?

10:48

665

noncompete litigation layered with a choice-of-law analysis.75 Employers and employees who enter into noncompete agreements
likely have little understanding of whether their agreement is enforceable under the chosen law or whether the chosen forum would
even apply that state’s noncompete law.76 This uncertainty stems, at
least in large part, from the significant variation between state policies.77 A federal noncompete policy would bring welcome clarity to
the noncompete sphere.78
An effective federal policy would prohibit many noncompetes,
increasing workers’ freedom to navigate the workforce while still
allowing noncompetes in some circumstances. This approach would
fall somewhere between the extremes of California and Florida and
provide much needed uniformity and clarity to all parties.79 An
ideal policy would also include an enforcement mechanism to prevent employers from taking advantage of unknowing employees by
including unlawful noncompetes in their employment contracts.80
The Workforce Mobility Act, which was introduced as a bill in
the U.S. Senate in 2019 and reintroduced in 2021, provides a solid
blueprint for solving the unpredictability problem and addressing
75. See Ribstein, supra note 20, at 375–76 (finding that courts generally enforce choice-of-law provisions in commercial contracts, but disproportionately fail
to enforce them in noncompete cases). This unusual treatment of choice-of-law
clauses in noncompete cases can result in unpredictability for employers, who are
likely accustomed to courts upholding their choice-of-law provisions in other contexts. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892 (8th Cir.
2006) (applying Nebraska noncompete law despite the parties’ choice-of-law provision electing for Ohio law). Ohio courts are empowered to reform unreasonable
noncompete agreements in order to make them enforceable, while Nebraska
courts will simply invalidate unreasonable noncompetes. Id. at 897. The court held
that the application of Ohio law would violate a fundamental policy of Nebraska
law. Id. Employing Nebraska law, the court sided with the Defendant employees,
finding the noncompete to be unreasonable. Id.; see also Zimmer, Inc. v. Sharpe,
651 F. Supp. 2d 840, 840–52 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (finding that under the law of Louisiana, where the employment took place, the noncompete might be unenforceable,
but applying Indiana law and therefore upholding the noncompete because it
would not be contrary to Louisiana public policy).
77. Supra Section II.B.
78. See William Constagny, Clarion Call for a Uniform or Model Noncompete
Law Act, 48 LAB. & EMP. L. 11, 11 (2019) (arguing that uniformity is needed to
solve inconsistency problems in the noncompete sphere).
79. See supra Section II.B.3 (advocating for a noncompete policy that protects
employees and preserves employers’ interests). Compare CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE
§ 16600 (1941) (prohibiting noncompetes in California), with FLA. STAT. § 542.335
(b), (c) (2016) (permitting noncompete agreements that serve a legitimate business
interest—including a long yet inexhaustive list of legitimate business interests—
and allowing courts to blue pencil, or amend, unreasonable noncompetes into a
permissible restrictive covenant).
80. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
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the fairness and economic concerns that exist in the current
noncompete landscape.81 As an alternative to legislation, the FTC
has publicly considered the possibility of issuing a rule on noncompetes, and President Biden explicitly encouraged such action in an
Executive Order.82 If the FTC were to make a rule governing
noncompetes, that rule should pursue a policy similar to the one
envisioned by the Workforce Mobility Act.83
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Federal Legislation or FTC Rule?
Members of Congress and FTC regulators have publicly considered how to remedy existing issues with noncompetes.84 The
U.S. Senate held a hearing on this issue and proposed specific bills
to address it, while the FTC held a workshop to explore the possibility of action.85 Congress should pass a law that prohibits unnecessary noncompetes. Such a law would preempt existing state law,
bringing needed consistency to noncompete enforcement.86 A po81. See infra Section III.A.1 (analyzing how a law like the Workforce Mobility
Act would solve the unpredictability problem, help employees, and still protect
employers’ legitimate interests).
82. Hearings to Examine Noncompete Agreements and American Workers, Including S.124 to Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to Prevent Employers
from Using Non-compete Agreements in Employment Contracts for Certain Nonexempt Employees, and S.2614, to Prohibit Certain Noncompete Agreements Before
the S. Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship Comm., 116th Cong. (2019); Exec. Order
No. 14036, 86 C.F.R. 36987 (2021). The order stated:
To address agreements that may unduly limit workers’ ability to change
jobs, the Chair of the FTC is encouraged to consider working with the
rest of the Commission to exercise the FTC’s statutory rulemaking authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to curtail the unfair use
of non-compete clauses and other clauses or agreements that may unfairly limit worker mobility.
Id at § 5(g).
83. See infra Section III.B.1 (analyzing the Workforce Mobility Act and examining why it would be an effective law).
84. See Workforce Mobility Act, S. 483, 117th Cong. (2021–2022); Freedom to
Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); see also FTC, NONCOMPETES IN
THE WORKPLACE: EXAMINING ANTITRUST AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES
(2020), https://bit.ly/3ExfkM6 [https://perma.cc/DX3P-JM77] [hereinafter FTC:
NONCOMPETES IN THE WORKPLACE].
85. S. 483; S. 124; FTC: NONCOMPETES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 84.
The FTC also posted a Solicitation for Public Comment on contract terms that may
be harmful to fair competition, including noncompete clauses. FTC, Solicitation for
Public Comments on Contract Terms that May Harm Competition (Aug. 5, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3mHKf2l [https://perma.cc/LK36-3RKV].
86. See infra Section III.A.1–2 (advocating for an express preemption clause
and conducting a preemption analysis of a federal noncompete legislation in the
absence of an express preemption clause).
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tential FTC rule, if it survives legal challenges, should prohibit most
noncompetes as well.
1. Federal Legislation
Although bipartisan politics has become rarer, members of
Congress on both sides of the political aisle have supported various
forms of noncompete legislation.87 In 2018, Democratic Senators
Chris Murphy (D-CT), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Ron Wyden
(D-OR) introduced the Workforce Mobility Act,88 which sought to
broadly invalidate and ban noncompete agreements. Next, Republican Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) introduced the Freedom to Compete Act89 in January 2019, which sought to amend the Fair Labor
Standards Act90 by banning and invalidating noncompetes for nonexempt employees.
Compromising between these two partisan bills, Republican
Senator Todd Young (R-IN) joined Senator Murphy in a revamped,
bipartisan Workforce Mobility Act in October 2019;91 the bill was
reintroduced in 2021 (“the Act”) by Senators Young, Murphy, Kevin Cramer (R-ND) and Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Representatives
Scott Peters (D-CA-52) and Peter Meijer (R-MI-3).92 This proposal
renders noncompetes invalid except in certain limited situations.93
This limitation of noncompete agreements would restore freedom
to the workforce and still preserve the legitimate interests of employers by protecting trade secrets and the goodwill of sales of businesses. In addition, the Act requires employers to post notice of the
87. See, e.g., LAUREL HARBRIDGE, IS BIPARTISANSHIP DEAD? POLICY
AGREEMENT AND AGENDA-SETTING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 18
(2015) (“[T]he prevalence of party unity in House voting has increased . . . , bipartisan patterns of voting have declined, and . . . the resulting estimates of legislator
ideology show evidence of increased polarization.”); Workforce Mobility Act, S.
2782, 115th Cong. (2017–2018); Workforce Mobility Act, S. 2614, 116th Cong.
(2019–2020); Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019–2020).
88. Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2017–2018).
89. S. 124. The Act allows employers to enter into noncompete agreements
with those classified as exempt executive, administrative, professional, or outside
sales employees under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Id. Generally, this would apply to low-wage, hourly workers. Id. Further, this act would still
allow employers to use restrictive covenants to protect trade secrets. Id.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–62 (1938).
91. Workforce Mobility Act of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019–2020).
92. S. 483, 117th Cong. (2021–2022); Workforce Mobility Act of 2021, H.R.
1367, 117th Cong. (2021).
93. S. 483 § 5(a). Exceptions include the sale of goodwill or ownership interest and partnership dissolution or disassociation. Id. § 3(b). The bill also allows
employers to enter into other types of restrictive covenants to protect trade
secrets. Id. § 4.
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Act in the workplace.94 Both the FTC and Department of Labor
would have power to enforce the Act, and it provides a private right
of action as well.95 This part of the Act would keep employers from
including unlawful noncompete agreements in their employment
contracts. The Act would add clarity and predictability to a confusing area of law and protect employees by eliminating unfair, unnecessarily restrictive noncompetes while preserving the legitimate
interests of employers that motivate them to draft noncompetes.96
For these reasons, Congress should enact a law that is similar to the
Workforce Mobility Act.97
As further evidence of lawmakers’ interest in noncompetes,
the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship
held a hearing in connection with the latest Workforce Mobility Act
bill and the Freedom to Compete Act bill “to examine noncompete
agreements and American workers” in November 2019.98 Although
lawmakers have not reached an agreement on precisely how to handle noncompete agreements, recent activity in the Senate, including
three proposed bills sponsored by multiple members of both parties
and a committee hearing in the few years before 2021, indicates
some level of motivation for federal legislation on noncompete
agreements.
a. How Federal Legislation Would Change Enforcement of
Noncompetes
Of the three pieces of legislation, the Workforce Mobility Act
of 2021 (“The Act”) is the best option to address existing noncompete issues while still protecting legitimate employer interests. It
generally bans noncompetes by rendering them ineffective with certain limited exceptions.99 The Act allows noncompete agreements
for the purpose of preventing anyone who sells a business interest
from carrying on a like business in a specified geographic area.100
The Act would also permit noncompetes, limited by geography and
time, between buyers or sellers of a business interest and senior
94. Id.
95. Id. § 6.
96. Id.
97. See infra Section III.A.1.a.
98. Hearings to Examine Noncompete Agreements and American Workers, Including S.124 to Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to Prevent Employers
from Using Non-compete Agreements in Employment Contracts for Certain Nonexempt Employees, and S.2614, to Prohibit Certain Noncompete Agreements Before
the S. Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship Comm., 116th Cong. (2019).
99. S. 483, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (2021–2022).
100. Id. § 3(b)(1).
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executive officials with severance agreements.101 Partners would be
permitted to enter into geographically limited noncompete agreements upon the dissolution of a partnership or dissociation of a
partner from a partnership.102 Finally, the Act permits employers to
enter into other types of restrictive covenants to protect trade
secrets.103
Most notably, this legislation eliminates the “reasonableness”
test that is employed by most jurisdictions in one form or another.104 By removing this inquiry into reasonableness and instead
establishing concrete circumstances in which noncompetes are allowed, the Act would provide clarity to both employers and employees who might otherwise feel unsure about whether a court
would uphold their noncompete agreement. This change would also
significantly reduce the burden on state courts to determine
whether a noncompete agreement is enforceable. Rather than digging into their state’s respective reasonableness standard, courts
would need to merely examine whether the noncompete in question meets one of the Act’s enumerated circumstances.105
In addition to the exceptions included in the 2021 version of
the Workforce Mobility Act, the final legislation should add an exception to allow noncompetes for executive-level employees. Executives are less likely to face the same bargaining power problems as
low-level workers, and they negotiate the terms of their noncompetes more often.106 Noncompetes are unnecessary and harmful for
most workers, who lack sufficient knowledge of enforceability and
101. Id. § 3(b)(1)(D).
102. Id. § 3(b)(2).
103. Id. § 4.
104. See Thomas Reuters, Non-Compete Agreements, 50 State Statutory
Surveys: Employment: Private Employment, WESTLAW, 0060 Surveys 23 (Nov.
2020) (showing many states that require a reasonableness test); see also, e.g., Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 733 (Pa. 1995) (“In order for a
‘non-competition’ covenant to be enforceable, it must . . . be reasonably limited it
both time and territory.”) (internal citations omitted); Motion Control Sys., Inc. v.
East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 425–26 (Va. 2001) (“The restraint . . . must be reasonable in
light of sound public policy.”).
105. S. 483, 117th Cong. § 3(b) (2021–2022).
106. See Lipsitz & Starr, supra note 36 (finding that the standard freedom-tocontract and investment arguments made in favor of noncompetes apply to highwage workers, but not low-wage workers); see also Labor Force, supra note 16, at
34 (showing that few employees consult with an attorney prior to signing a
noncompete, but those that consult with attorneys are the most likely to negotiate
their noncompete); Bishara, Martin, & Thomas, supra note 28, at 8 (“[Noncompete] concerns are largely absent for CEOs who accept restrictive covenants in
their employment contracts. This is because CEOs enjoy substantial bargaining
power and are routinely represented by legal counsel when they negotiate their
employment contracts.”).
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the ability to negotiate the clause.107 In contrast, high-level employees are more likely to negotiate higher wages or other incentives in
exchange for the noncompete, which protects the employer’s investment in the executive’s human capital.108
Finally, Congress should enact noncompete legislation because
a uniform noncompete policy would significantly reduce the inconsistencies and uncertainties that are caused by the existing patchwork of state laws and choice-of-law provisions.
b. Would the Legislation Preempt Existing State Laws?
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution109 states that
the laws of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
Courts begin a preemption analysis with a rebuttable presumption
against preemption.110
Congress can preempt state laws expressly or impliedly.111 Express preemption occurs when Congress states in the statute that
the law preempts state law, while implied preemption occurs when
a court decides that a federal law preempts state law notwithstanding the absence of an explicit preemption provision.112 As of 2022,
the Workforce Mobility Act does not include an express preemption clause.113 An example of an express preemption clause relating
107. See supra Section II.A. (discussing the harmful impact noncompetes can
have on low-wage workers).
108. See Bishara, Martin, & Thomas, supra note 28, at 18 (“[T]he CEO has
greater bargaining power in the employment relationship than most employees”
and therefore negotiates noncompetes more often); Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that
Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J. L., ECON. & ORG., 376, 382 (2011) (“Firm investments in manager
human capital . . . may take the form of training, permitting the manager . . . to
engage in human-capital-improving projects or the revelation of trade secrets are
highly vulnerable to the departure of the manager.”).
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“When addressing questions of
express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”).
111. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (“State
action may be foreclosed by express language in a congressional enactment, by
implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies
the legislative field, or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional
enactment.”) (internal citations omitted).
112. See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“Congress
may indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its
structure and purpose.”).
113. Workforce Mobility Act, S. 483, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (2021–2022).
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to employment can be found in the Immigration Reform and Contract Act (“IRCA”).114 IRCA contains language prohibiting state
or local laws from imposing civil or criminal sanctions on those who
employ, recruit, or refer unauthorized aliens.115
Federal legislation on noncompetes should include an express
preemption clause to solve the issue of unpredictability most effectively. By explicitly stating that Congress intends to create a uniform, federal standard governing noncompetes and that the law
preempts state laws on noncompetes, Congress would ensure that
the patchwork of state laws would no longer cause confusion to employees or employers.
In the absence of an express preemption clause, federal legislation can still preempt state law through implied preemption, which
can be found in three forms: conflict preemption, obstacle preemption, and field preemption.116 Conflict preemption occurs when
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility.”117 Obstacle preemption occurs if state law “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”118 Finally, field preemption occurs when federal law has created a scheme that is pervasive
enough to “make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.”119
Conflict preemption would not apply to noncompete legislation because employers can comply with the federal law and their
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The provisions of this section preempt any State
or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and
similar laws) upon those who employ or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens.”).
115. Id.; see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 600
(2011) (acknowledging that IRCA expressly preempts some state powers dealing
with the employment of unauthorized aliens and expressly preserves other powers
for states).
116. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). The
Court stated:
We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides state law
either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law. We have found implied conflict preemption where it
is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
117. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963).
118. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
119. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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state’s law by choosing not to use a noncompete clause in an employment contract.120 Field preemption would not apply to
noncompete legislation either because the federal government has
not commandeered employment law; employment remains well
within the traditional scope of state authority.121
Noncompete legislation’s highest potential for implied preemption comes from obstacle preemption, in which a state law impedes
a federal objective.122 Under this analysis, the Supreme Court seeks
to determine whether a state law would be “consistent with the
structure and purpose” of the federal law as a whole.123 In Gade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Association,124 the Supreme
Court held that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Act (OSHA) impliedly preempted state regulation of safety and
health issues in the workplace because the Act’s purpose and structure indicated a desire by Congress to subject employers and employees to one set of regulations.125
Congress’s purpose for passing a noncompete law would be an
increase in worker freedom and mobility and the uniform limitation
of noncompete agreements to a clear, explicit set of categories. In
order for those purposes to be achieved, the Act would need to
serve at least as a floor, preventing states from enforcing a standard
more relaxed than the federal statute. Congress’s objective would
be frustrated if states could continue to allow noncompetes prohibited by the Act, so the Act would need to preclude state laws that
would allow for noncompetes prohibited by the federal statute. California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, the three states that explicitly prohibit noncompetes by statute, each allow for limited
exceptions in a similar vein to the proposed bill, but the final law
should also include an exception for executive contracts, which is
not permitted in these states.126 If Congress were to pass the
120. Workforce Mobility Act, S. 483, 117th Cong. (2021–2022).
121. See, e.g., Capron v. Off. of Att’y Gen. of Mass., 944 F.3d 9, 24 (1st Cir.
2019) (referring to employment as a “quintessentially local concern” in a field preemption analysis).
122. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
123. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (WEST 1941) (prohibiting noncompetes in California); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2019) (prohibiting noncompetes
except for sale-of-business and partnership dissolution contexts); 15 OK. STAT.
§ 15-218–19(A) (2014) (prohibiting noncompetes in Oklahoma except for sale-ofbusiness and partnership dissolution contexts); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 16601–02 (West 1997), 16602.5 (2007) (allowing for noncompetes in sale-of-business and partnership dissolution contexts in California).
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Workforce Mobility Act or a similar law, it would represent a compromise between employee and employer interests, which is evidenced by the fact that an initial bill completely banned
noncompetes, but the final bill would allow for limited exceptions.
Any state laws that are stricter than the federal law would also be
preempted because they would frustrate this compromise, but to
ensure preemption of state noncompete laws, the federal law
should include an express preemption clause.
2. FTC Rule
a. Could the FTC Issue a Rule?
Although a noncompete statute has some level of bipartisan
support in Congress, bipartisan legislation is difficult to rely on, so
President Biden and some lawmakers have called for the FTC to
use its rulemaking power to address noncompetes.127 Whether the
FTC has the authority to promulgate a noncompete rule with the
effect of substantive law is uncertain.128 The FTC’s authority to regulate noncompetes would come from Section 5 of the FTC Act,
which empowers the FTC to prevent unfair methods of competition
as well as unfair or deceptive acts or practices.129
The FTC Act explicitly grants the FTC rulemaking authority in
Section 6(g),130 but for a number of reasons, the FTC has never
passed a rule exclusively based on the FTC Act’s prohibition on
methods of unfair competition.131 The FTC has occasionally passed
rules regulating unfair or deceptive acts or practices, a power that
was confirmed by the D.C. Circuit in National Petroleum Refiners
Association v. FTC.132 In that case, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged
the FTC’s rulemaking authority pursuant to Section 5, which includes both unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods
of competition.133 Two years later, Congress passed The Magnuson127. See HARBRIDGE, supra note 87 (explaining rising levels of polarization
resulting in lower levels of bipartisan legislation); Exec. Order No. 14036, 86
C.F.R. 36987 (2021); Letter from Elizabeth Warren & Chris Murphy, United States
Senators, to Joseph J. Simons, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (July 21,
2020) (on file with the United States Senate).
128. See FTC: NONCOMPETES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 84.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (2006) (granting the FTC the power “to make rules and
regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this subchapter.”).
131. Rohit Chopra & Lina M. Khan, The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 366–68 (2020) (arguing for the FTC,
which has solely relied on adjudication to address competition matters, to utilize its
rulemaking authority).
132. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
133. Id. at 697–98.
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Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(“Magnuson-Moss”),134 which articulated the FTC’s rulemaking authority and procedure for unfair or deceptive acts or practices, but
left untouched unfair methods of competition rulemaking.
Magnuson-Moss introduced stronger procedural requirements
for rulemaking related to unfair or deceptive acts or practices.135
The FTC Improvements Act of 1980136 added even more procedural requirements to Magnuson-Moss rulemaking but once again applied only to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, not unfair
methods of competition.137 The section identifies itself as the sole
authority for rulemaking with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or
practices but states that this restriction “shall not affect any authority of the Commission to prescribe rules (including interpretative
rules), and general statements of policy, with respect to unfair
methods of competition . . . .”138 This provision preserves the FTC’s
rulemaking authority under Section 6(g) pursuant to its Section 5
authority over unfair methods of competition and indicates that the
FTC can indeed promulgate rules based solely on its authority to
prohibit unfair methods of competition.139
The FTC’s interpretation of its rulemaking authority can
strengthen its ability to survive legal challenges to a noncompete
rule, as the Supreme Court extended Chevron140 deference to an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguity relating to the scope of its
statutory authority.141 The FTC currently interprets Section 6(g) as
authorization to make rules concerning unfair methods of competition, and that position should be given deference in accordance
with the decision in City of Arlington v. FCC.142
134. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312
(2012)).
135. Id.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 57.
137. Chopra & Khan, supra note 131, at 378; see also Justin Hurwitz, Chevron
and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust, 76 PITT. L. REV. 209, 234 (2014).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(2) (1980).
139. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 56(g); see also Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the FTC has rulemaking authority
under §§ 45 & 46 to make rules over unfair and deceptive acts or practices and
unfair methods of competition).
140. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
141. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 290 (2013).
142. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://bit.ly/
3mtoVh1 [https://perma.cc/63CG–W9G7] (May 2021) (“Section 6(g) continues to
authorize rules concerning unfair methods of competition.”).
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Nevertheless, the FTC would likely face both political and legal challenges if they were to pursue substantive rulemaking pursuant to these provisions.143 National Petroleum has been criticized
for misinterpreting both the text and legislative history of the FTC
Act.144 Furthermore, the modern Supreme Court is more hostile to
the administrative state than the 1970s D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to view the National Petroleum issue in the
same light as the Circuit Court.145
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States146 represents
another roadblock for the FTC to exercise its rulemaking authority.
In that case, the Supreme Court struck down Congress’s delegation
of the authority to approve “codes of fair competition” to the President in the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”).147 In its
decision, the Court contrasted the NIRA with the FTC’s Section 5
authority over unfair methods of competition, praising the FTC’s
adjudicative process for determining what constitutes “unfair competition” on a case-by-case basis.148
Specifically, the Court explained that “what constitutes ‘unfair
methods of competition’ must be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in light of particular competitive conditions
and of what is found to be a specific and substantial public interest.”149 This dicta in Schechter Poultry could stand in the way of
Section 5 rulemaking over unfair methods of competition because a
143. Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: Was National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC Correctly Decided?, YALE J. ON REGUL. (Jan. 10,
2020), https://bit.ly/3pCUeba [https://perma.cc/TLM7-QH3E].
144. See Thomas W. Merrill & Katheryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 554–57 (2002)
(“Judge Wright’s opinion reflected no recognition of a central difference between
the rulemaking grants given to the agencies [in cases he cited] and the FTC’s general rulemaking grant: namely, that the rulemaking grants in those cases, unlike
Section 6(g), were coupled with statutory provisions imposing sanctions for rule
violations.”). The authors argue that the legislative history of the FTC Act does
not support the notion that Congress intended to grant the FTC legislative
rulemaking authority. Id.
145. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State
Under Seige, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017) (analyzing the modern Supreme Court’s
hostility toward administrative agencies’ power); Reul E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s
Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1139, 1151 (2001) (“Federal courts [in the 1960s and 1970s] were not in the
least bit hostile to rulemaking. They consistently upheld agency rulemaking powers, even in instances when it was unclear that Congress intended to grant an
agency such powers.”).
146. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
147. Id. at 551.
148. Id. at 532–34.
149. Id.
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court may view that language as an acknowledgement that Section
5 empowers the FTC only to adjudicate unfair methods of competition on a case-by-case basis rather than create a sweeping rule.150
Schechter Poultry should not preclude rulemaking that regulates unfair methods of competition. Schechter Poultry and its sister
case decided the same year, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,151 are
the only two instances of the Court using the “nondelegation doctrine” to invalidate a statute.152 Schechter Poultry invalidated the
NIRA as an improper delegation of legislative power because it
provided no standards or guiding principles to the President in how
to exercise the delegated power.153
Despite its dormancy, the nondelegation doctrine has survived
decades of the Court choosing to not apply it, serving primarily as a
reminder to Congress to include some sort of intelligible guiding
principle when delegating legislative powers.154 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court “has almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgement that can be left to those executing or applying the
law.”155 Congressional delegation to agencies has withstood the
tests of time ever since Schechter Poultry, and FTC rulemaking independent of Magnuson-Moss was upheld by the D.C. Circuit long
after Schechter Poultry.156 There is no reason to believe that, had
the FTC chosen to make rules regarding unfair methods of competition over the years, it would have been the occasion for the Court
to set aside its decades of deference and finally awaken the
nondelegation doctrine.
In the past, a rule over unfair methods of competition would
have likely survived along with every other rule that has been
threatened by nondelegation concerns since 1935, but the current
composition of the Supreme Court could bring new opportunities
for the nondelegation doctrine to be revived.157 In a recent case,
150. Id.
151. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
152. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1405 (2000) (“Although the Court has not overruled them, it has not since applied them or the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a piece of legislation.”). The nondelegation
doctrine prohibits private lawmaking and requires limiting standards when Congress delegates its legislative powers. Id. at 1401.
153. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541–42.
154. Bressman, supra note 152, at 1405.
155. Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 697–98 (1973).
157. See infra Section III.A.2.a (considering the future of the nondelegation
doctrine).
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Gundy v. United States,158 the Court upheld a delegation of congressional power, but JUSTICE ALITO acknowledged in a concurrence that he would support a reconsideration of the Court’s
approach to nondelegation.159 JUSTICE GORSUCH, joined by CHIEF
JUSTICE ROBERTS and JUSTICE THOMAS, went a step further,
bemoaning the Court’s approach to nondelegation as “an understanding of the Constitution at war with its text and history.”160 JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH, who did not participate in Gundy,
acknowledged that “JUSTICE GORSUCH’S scholarly analysis of the
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may
warrant further consideration in future cases.”161 While a
reimagined nondelegation doctrine could alter the trajectory of an
FTC rule, the current nondelegation doctrine does not pose a threat
to a theoretical noncompete rule.
Although the FTC could pursue a noncompete rule consistent
with judicial precedent and the language of its enabling act, numerous legal challenges, particularly in light of modern Supreme Court
justices’ attitudes toward the administrative state, threaten the viability of such a rule.162 An FTC rule would be riskier than federal
legislation due to these threats, but even with the risk of invalidation, the possibility of its survival makes it an improvement over the
current noncompete regime because it would bring uniformity and
protect employees while preserving employers’ legitimate interests.
b. Would an FTC Rule Preempt Existing State Laws?
Because there is no precedent for unfair methods of competition rulemaking, a noncompete rule’s ability to preempt state
noncompete law remains an open question that requires an analysis
of scattered judicial precedent and the history of FTC
rulemaking.163
Adding further uncertainty to the preemption question is the
fact that the Supreme Court has never spoken to the FTC’s preemption power.164 Some guidance can be found in City of New
158. Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116 (2019).
159. Id. at 2131 (ALITO, J., concurring).
160. Id. (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).
161. Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342, 342 (Mem) (2019), cert. denied.
162. See infra notes 129–53 and accompanying text.
163. See infra Section III.A.2.b (conducting a preemption analysis of an FTC
rule).
164. See Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and Section
5 of the FTC Act, 115 MICH. L. REV. 365, 410 (2016) ([T]the Supreme Court has
never decided . . . whether the [FTC] enjoys superior-preemptive authority over
anticompetitive state laws.”).
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York v. FCC, where the Court upheld the Federal Communication
Commission’s preemption authority over conflicting state regulations regarding cable television standards.165 The opinion noted
that an agency can preempt state law if that preemption “represents
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute . . . unless it appears from
the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned.”166
Magnuson-Moss delegated complete power to the FTC to regulate unfair or deceptive acts or practices.167 The D.C. Circuit upheld the FTC’s rulemaking authority in National Petroleum Refiners
Association v. FTC,168 but Magnuson-Moss codified that rulemaking authority with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices.169
Judicial precedent, both before and after Magnuson-Moss, has generally interpreted the FTC Act’s legislative history as supportive of
FTC preemption authority.170
As for preemption relating to unfair methods of competition,
an Eighth Circuit case decided shortly after the FTC Act’s passing
indicated a sentiment at the time that Congress intended to allow
165. See generally City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
166. Id. at 64 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
167. Tod H. Cohen, Double Vision: The FTC, State Regulation, and Deciding
What’s Best for Consumers, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1991) (citing
United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277 n.6 (1975) (stating that
Congress specifically intended to make the FTC’s jurisdictional power coextensive
with that of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
168. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
169. Id. at 697–98; see 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1975) (articulating the FTC’s
rulemaking authority and procedure for unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
170. See Cohen, supra note 167, at 1267 (arguing that Congress delegated a
preemption power to the FTC with Magnuson-Moss); Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n v. FTC,
767 F.2d 957, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the legislative history of the
FTC Act and Magnuson-Moss indicated Congress delegated preemption authority
to the FTC to protect consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices); Peerless Prods. v. FTC, 284 F.2d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1960) (“[The FTC] can restrain
unfair business practices in interstate commerce even if the activities or industries
have been the subject of legislation by a state or even if the intrastate conduct is
authorized by state law.”) (internal citations omitted); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262
F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1959) (holding that “[i]f the Commission determines upon a
reasonable basis that certain conduct constitutes an unfair method of competition,
it may order those responsible to cease and desist even if the conduct is authorized
by state law”); Katharine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 666–67 (2d Cir.
1979) (assuming that the FTC had preemption authority but remanding for lack of
specificity in which state laws were unfair acts). But see Cal. State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down an FTC rule regarding optometry practices because “[a]n agency may not exercise authority over
States as sovereigns unless that authority has been unambiguously granted to it”
and “nothing in the language of the [FTC] Act clearly expresses a congressional
intent to empower the FTC to regulate state action”).
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preemption authority for the FTC.171 The Circuit Court went so far
as to say any state law “falls blunted” if it “strikes at” the FTC’s
congressionally vested authority to regulate unfair methods of
competition.172
The Supreme Court addressed preemption for anticompetitive
matters in the context of the Sherman Antitrust Act173 in Parker v.
Brown.174 The Court concluded that the Sherman Act did not preempt state regulation because nothing in the Sherman Act’s language and history indicated it could be used to restrain state
action.175 Eventually, the Court devised a two-part test to determine whether a state action should receive immunity from the preemption envisioned in Parker.176 Under this test, the Sherman Act
preempts an anticompetitive state statute unless the policy is
“‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’”
and “‘actively supervised’ by the state itself.”177
Because of Parker’s application to anticompetitive matters,
some might argue that it would apply to an FTC rule against unfair
methods of competition. Although the FTC has not ventured to test
whether Parker immunity extends to its own authority over unfair
methods of competition, case law and legislative history indicate
that the ideas guiding the Parker decision do not translate to Section 5 of the FTC Act.178 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the Sherman Act and the FTC Act may have overlapping responsibilities, but the FTC’s standard of “unfairness” stretches beyond practices that violate existing antitrust laws like the Sherman
Act.179
The Supreme Court has even acknowledged the possibility that
the FTC is not subject to Parker state action immunity and left the
171. Chamber of Com. of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 684 (8th Cir.
1926) (“Congress, in the Federal Trade Commission Act, has assumed to legislate
concerning unfair methods of competition . . . [and if the FTC identifies an unfair
method of competition] it is certainly subject to that act, no matter what the state
has or has not authorized or permitted in that respect.”).
172. Id.
173. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1–7.
174. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
175. Id. at 350–52.
176. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 97 (1980).
177. Id. at 97.
178. See Crane & Hester, supra note 164, at 376–81 (analyzing why Parker
should not extend to Section 5).
179. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (extending FTC
power over “unfairness” to any practice that the FTC deems to be against public
policy).
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matter open to future consideration.180 Federal circuit courts have
not addressed the matter in years, but they remain split on the issue.181 The Fourth Circuit’s decision on this matter raises a key
point in favor of FTC preemption power by citing FTC v. National
Casualty Co.182 In that case, the Court concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson Act limited the FTC’s authority to preempt state laws
regarding insurance advertising practices.183 The Fourth Circuit’s
use of this decision indicates a belief that “the FTC could regulate
noninsurance advertising practices (or any business practice), even
when a state is also regulating that conduct.”184
The D.C. Circuit decision against FTC preemption in Cal. State
State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC,185 meanwhile, stresses that
Magnuson-Moss and Section 5 of the FTC Act do not contain explicit indications of congressional intent to “alter the state-federal
balance.”186 However, the Optometry decision came in a context
substantially distinct from a potential noncompete rule. The challenged rule in that case declared certain state or local governmental
acts relating to the regulation of optometrists to be unfair acts or
practices.187 The D.C. Circuit rejected this FTC rule because it
found the FTC Act was intended to regulate anticompetitive conduct of businesses, not the conduct of states or localities.188 In contrast, a noncompete rule would regulate employers, not government
actors. Further, the D.C. Circuit misapplied Parker to the FTC.189
Unlike the Sherman Act, the FTC Act’s history indicates a
Congressional intent for the FTC to be able to preempt state ac180. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992) (noting that the FTC
has argued that Parker immunity does not apply to Section 5 of the FTC Act but
refusing to address it because the FTC did not assert that position in the case).
181. Compare Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1959) (rejecting in dicta the argument that the FTC cannot nullify a state statute because
“[i]f the Commission determines upon a reasonable basis that certain conduct constitutes an unfair method of competition, it may order those responsible to cease
and desist even if the conduct is authorized by state law.”), and Peerless Prods.,
Inc. v. FTC, 284 F.2d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1960) (referring to the FTC’s Section 5
authority as “plenary” and overriding of a local ordinance), with Cal. State Bd. of
Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976, 980–82 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying Parker’s state
action immunity to the FTC and thereby finding the FTC could not preempt state
laws).
182. FTC v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 562–63 (1958).
183. Id.
184. Crane & Hester, supra note 164, at 378 n.80.
185. Optometry, 910 F.2d 976.
186. Id. at 982.
187. Id. at 979.
188. Id. at 980.
189. See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
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tion.190 In the quarter-century that passed between the passing of
the Sherman Act and the passing of the FTC Act, the political concerns that brought about the FTC Act centered on the failings of
states to adequately address anticompetitive actions.191
Mere months before Congress passed the FTC Act, the Supreme Court upheld preemption of state laws by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC).192 Five days after this decision, well
in the midst of congressional debate on the creation of the FTC,
Senator Newlands introduced Section 5 and its power to prevent
unfair competition with the explicit intention of “building up a system of administrative law regarding trade as the [ICC had] been
. . . .”193 In the ensuing months of congressional debate, both supporters and critics of the bill expressed an expectation that the
FTC’s powers would be analogous to those of the ICC.194
FTC rulemaking pursuant to its power over unfair methods of
competition should have preemption authority over state law.
When Congress first passed the FTC Act, it did so with an understanding that the FTC would have powers analogous to the ICC,
and a Supreme Court decision granting the ICC preemption power
was incredibly fresh in Congress’s minds.195 The Eighth Circuit reiterated that Congress intended for the FTC to have preemption authority shortly after the FTC Act’s passing.196 Although any
regulation relating to competition raises Parker state action immunity concerns, the Court’s reasoning in Parker applied to the Sherman Act, and the FTC’s Section 5 authority is not analogous to that
of the Sherman Act in the context of that decision.
Still, unresolved legal questions surrounding the FTC’s preemption authority, especially pursuant to its rulemaking authority
under Sections 4(g) and 5, raise risks of ineffectiveness. Because of
these potential pitfalls, federal legislation should be pursued instead
190. Crane & Hester, supra note 164, at 381–98.
191. Id. at 389.
192. Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 359–60
(1914). Known as the Shreveport Rate Cases, this decision’s substantive impact has
not withstood a century of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but its impact on congressional decisionmakers at the time of the FTC Act’s passing nevertheless bears
relevance to legislative intent. Crane & Hester, supra note 164, at 393.
193. Crane & Hester, supra note 164, at 395 (citing 51 CONG. REC. 10, 376
(1914) (statement of Sen. Newlands)).
194. Id. at 397. No distinction was made during these deliberations between
the FTC and ICC’s preemption powers. Id. During one exchange on the Senate
floor, multiple Senators explicitly expressed an understanding that the Act would
have preemption power over state law. Id. at 398.
195. See supra Section III.A.2.b.
196. Chamber of Com. of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 684 (8th Cir.
1926).
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of an FTC rule, as Congress’s preemption authority is unquestioned, and it could therefore definitively bring nationwide predictability and fairness to noncompetes.197
B. Recommendation
To best address the problems posed by noncompetes, Congress
should pass legislation that generally bans noncompetes with certain exceptions that are limited by time and geography.198 The law
should allow for the use of noncompetes in connection with the sale
of a business or dissolution of a partnership.199 It should also include an exception for executive-level employment contracts because they do not face the same issues of knowledge and bargaining
power faced by other employees.200 The law must include enforcement mechanisms to ensure employers do not continue to use unlawful noncompetes, and it must preempt state laws to solve the
predictability problems caused by choice-of-law clauses and the variation in the current noncompete regime.201 It should also include
an express preemption clause to ensure preemption, although it
would likely impliedly preempt state law because its objective
would otherwise be frustrated.202
If federal legislation is not passed, the FTC should create a rule
using its rulemaking authority granted by Section 4(g) and Section 5
of the FTC Act.203 The rule should be identical to the law envisioned in the preceding paragraph because it would provide needed
protection to employees, preserve employers’ interests, and create a
uniform, predictable nationwide policy on noncompetes.204 Although the FTC likely has the legal authority to issue such a rule
and preempt state laws, numerous unresolved legal questions regarding the FTC’s rulemaking and preemption power could sabotage the rule, which is why federal legislation is a better option.205
IV.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, federal actors should pursue policy to reduce the
uncertainty that results from choice-of-law clauses accompanying
noncompete clauses. The existing state of the law, which is an amal197.
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gamation of different state policies, should be simplified into a uniform national standard.206 This federal policy should generally ban
noncompetes, which are harmful to employees and business competitors, and allow for limited exceptions to protect the employers’
legitimate interests.207 The federal legislation should allow for exceptions, limited by time and geography, in the contexts of the dissolution of partnerships and sales of businesses, and in employment
contracts of executive-level employees.208
Federal legislation is the best means to add needed protection
to employees, maintain adequate protection for employers, and
provide clarity and predictability for both parties.209 This legislation
would also include needed enforcement mechanisms and likely preempt state noncompete laws, which is essential for the uniformity
needed to safeguard predictability.210 This legislation should also
include an express preemption clause, but even without one, the
legislation would likely preempt state noncompete laws so it can
achieve its purpose of uniformity and fairness to employees.211
As an alternative, the FTC could pursue rulemaking pursuant
to their Section 5 authority over unfair methods of competition, but
legal challenges to its rulemaking authority and ability to preempt
state laws would bring another iteration of uncertainty to the
noncompete landscape.212 Ultimately, a statute passed by Congress,
which already has some level of bipartisan support, would be the
best approach to reform the noncompete landscape.
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